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Bayes not Bust!
Why simplicity is no problem for Bayesians ?
David L. Dowe, Steve Gardner and Graham Oppy ∗
ABSTRACT
The advent of formal definitions of the simplicity of a theory has important
implications for model selection. But what is the best way to define simplicity?
Forster and Sober ([1994]) advocate the use of Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC),
a non-Bayesian formalisation of the notion of simplicity. This forms an important
part of their wider attack on Bayesianism in the philosophy of science. We defend
a Bayesian alternative: the simplicity of a theory is to be characterised in terms
of Wallace’s Minimum Message Length (MML). We show that AIC is inadequate
for many statistical problems where MML performs well. Whereas MML is always
defined, AIC can be undefined. Whereas MML is not known ever to be statistically
inconsistent, AIC can be. Even when defined and consistent, AIC performs worse
than MML on small sample sizes. MML is statistically invariant under 1-to-1 re-
parametrisation, thus avoiding a common criticism of Bayesian approaches. We also
show that MML provides answers to many of Forster’s objections to Bayesianism.
Hence an important part of the attack on Bayesianism fails.
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? The title is the third in a sequence: the title of (Earman [1992]) asked
‘Bayes or Bust?’; in the title of his review of Earman’s book in the pages of
this journal, Forster ([1995]) affirmed that ‘Bayes and Bust’. Now comes our
dissent: ‘Bayes not Bust!’
∗ Corresponding author. The authors are listed alphabetically.
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1 Introduction
‘Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate,’ said William of Occam in the
14th century, ‘We should not posit plurality without necessity.’ In modern
times, Albert Einstein is said to have expressed much the same thought this
way: ‘Our theories should be as simple as possible, but no simpler.’
But what is simplicity in a theory? Historically, most attempts to understand
simplicity have tried to connect it up with aesthetic concepts such as beauty
and elegance. This approach has not been entirely satisfactory because these
concepts appear to be of a familiar type that bedevils philosophers: even
though we think we know them when we see them, they seem hard, if not
impossible, to define.
Still, the aesthetic appreciation of scientific theories has remained widespread.
This has had two important effects in the philosophy of science: firstly,
it has made it seem as though the question of what makes one theory
simpler than another does not have an objective answer. The argument
runs roughly: simplicity is a form of beauty; beauty is a matter of taste, and
there’s no accounting for taste. Secondly, it has driven some philosophers
of science to search elsewhere for ways to distinguish good theories from
bad. Popper and Hempel, both of whom tried to distinguish among theories
on the basis of their logical entailments, come especially to mind in this
connection.
It often happens, however, that discoveries in other fields of enquiry can
dramatically change the way we look at certain philosophical questions,
and here we encounter a rather startling example of this. For it turns out
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that the relatively new discipline of information theory allows us to say,
with mathematical precision, exactly how simple a theory is. Not only that,
it tells us exactly when we should prefer more complex theories to their
simpler alternatives. To gloss the theory very briefly at the outset, here’s
what it says: the best theory to infer from the data is the one that can be
stated with the data in a two-part message of the shortest length. This is
called the Minimum Message Length (MML) principle, and we owe it largely
to the work of Chris Wallace. One aim of this paper is to explain this result,
and its implications for philosophy of science.
The implication we are particularly interested in is the bearing this result
has on the debate about Bayesianism in the philosophy of science. This
complex and ongoing debate is difficult to summarise, but we’ll try to
characterise the opposing positions briefly here.
Bayesians hold that all of the important beliefs, attitudes and intuitions
that we have about scientific theories can be expressed in terms of probabilities
that certain propositions are true; that Bayes’s Rule of Conditionalisation
(for hypothesis H and evidence E)
posterior(H) = p(H|E) = p(H)p(E|H)
p(E)
tells us how we should update our beliefs in light of new evidence; and
that (therefore) some knowledge of, or reasonable assumptions about, our
prior knowledge of a situation (p(H) in the above) is indispensable in the
calculation of what we should believe about it in the light of evidence E.
Anti-Bayesians deny all of this: they hold that important aspects of our
attitudes towards scientific theories cannot adequately be captured by
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any statement expressed in terms of the probability that a proposition
is true; it follows that there are situations in which Bayes’s Rule is of no
use to us, since the Rule can only be applied if our prior knowledge of a
situation can be stated in terms of probabilities; but that is no matter, since
we have other tools that do not involve probabilities that tell us what we
should believe about scientific theories—the use of priors is therefore not
indispensable.
The connection between these two issues—on the one hand, the existence of
formalised notions of theoretical simplicity, and on the other, the arguments
about Bayesianism—isn’t obvious. To understand it, it helps to go back
to a paper written in 1994 by Malcolm Forster and Elliott Sober. In that
paper, they described and defended a different formalisation of the notion of
simplicity, based on the work of Akaike, than the one we wish to defend.
A detailed explanation of the difference between Akaike’s Information
Criterion (AIC) and the Minimum Message Length (MML) principle will
have to wait until later. The key point to make here in the Introduction is
that AIC is a non-Bayesian technique, making no essential use of conditionalisation
or of priors; by contrast, MML is a Bayesian technique that does make
essential use of conditionalisation and of priors.
With that in mind, Forster and Sober’s argument can be summarised as
follows: a formalised notion of the simplicity of a theory would be a great
breakthrough in the philosophy of science. Akaike’s Information Criterion
provides the best way of formalising the notion of the simplicity of a theory.
But AIC is a non-Bayesian technique. We should conclude, therefore, that
the best philosophy of science is non-Bayesian.
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The counter-argument presented in this paper goes like this: we agree
completely about the significance for philosophy of science of formalised
notions of simplicity. But we shall argue that AIC is a demonstrably inadequate
way of formalising that notion, and that the Minimum Message Length
principle provides a much superior formalisation, one that performs better
than AIC in every empirical test that we have tried. Since MML is a Bayesian
technique, we should conclude that the best philosophy of science is Bayesian.
The theoretical arguments mostly come first. In section 2, we define the
curve-fitting problem, the method of maximum likelihood, and the problem
of over-fitting. In section 3, we describe Akaike’s Information Criterion
(AIC) for doing model selection, and in section 4, the broader Predictive
Accuracy framework into which Forster places AIC. Section 5 introduces the
Minimum Message Length (MML) Principle, and describes the construction
of the Strict MML estimator, a language-invariant Bayesian estimator which
can be used for both model selection and parameter estimation.
In section 6, we exhibit direct comparisons between AIC and MML on
several different kinds of statistical inference problem. The comparisons are
all in favour of MML over AIC. We include examples of cases which MML
handles well, but for which AIC gives statistically inconsistent answers. Of
special interest is the Neyman-Scott problem (section 6.1.3), for on this
problem it turns out that aiming for predictive accuracy leads us to give
statistically inconsistent estimates. We also give examples where it appears
that AIC gives no answer at all.
Finally, in section 7 we show how the MML Principle meets two of Forster’s
oft-repeated objections to Bayesianism, the sub-family problem, and the
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problem of approximation. Our conclusion is that for philosophers of science,
Bayesianism remains the best—and perhaps the only—game in town.
2 The Curve Fitting Problem
The best way to engage with Forster and Sober’s 1994 argument is to follow
their exposition as far as possible, and then show where we diverge from
them. Since they begin their paper by describing what they call the ‘curve
fitting problem’, we shall do likewise.
The most general form of the curve fitting problem arises in many experimental
contexts. We have some data, which we can plot on a Cartesian plane, with
x- and y-axes. We represent a hypothesis about how the data was produced
by some function, which maps x-values onto unique y-values. For example,
the hypothesis that there is some specific linear relationship between the x
and y values is represented by the function
y = a1x+ a0
where a1 and a0 are constants (or co-efficients), giving respectively the
gradient of the line, and the point where the line intersects the y-axis.
2.1 Curves and families of curves
Without specifying the value of the co-efficients, we haven’t picked out
a specific function, but rather a family of functions, here, the family of
straight lines.
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Likewise, the hypothesis that there is quadratic relationship between the x
and y values is represented by the function
y = a2x
2 + a1x+ a0
which picks out the family of parabolas.
2.2 Noise
In a perfect world, experiments would be free of noise. In such a world,
if the true curve were a straight line, the data would fall exactly on that
straight line. But data is usually noisy, so even if the linear hypothesis is
correct, it doesn’t follow that our data will fall on a straight line. Rather,
while the data will tend to be close to a straight line, they will be dis ributed
above and below it.
It is typical to assume that noise is random with a Gaussian distribution of
unknown variance, σ2. We can therefore represent our hypotheses about the
observed relationship between the x and y values by adding another term to
our functions, e.g.:
y = a1x+ a0 +N(0, σ
2) or y = a2x
2 + a1x+ a0 +N(0, σ
2)
2.3 The Method of Maximum Likelihood
Let’s imagine just for the moment that we have some noisy data, and that
we know that the linear hypothesis is correct. We should like to know
exactly which straight line from the family of straight lines should be our
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best guess. We would also like to estimate how noisy the data is. This is
called parameter estimation.
One answer is that we should choose the line to which the data is closest.
We can measure the distance of some data from a line (or curve) by using
the least squares method.
This least squares method is an instance of a more general method—the
method of Maximum Likelihood (ML). The ML method says that if you
want to know which curve is the most likely to be true, choose the curve
which would have made the observed data most likely.
Note that it is important not to get confused between Pr(H|E), the probability
that a hypothesis is true given the evidence, and Pr(E|H), the probability
of observing the evidence, given the hypothesis, which we (following statistical
usage) call the likelihood.
2.4 Maximum Likelihood and Over-fitting
However, there’s a problem with the ML method. In the above, we assumed
that we knew that the linear hypothesis was correct. What if we don’t
know that? What if we have to do model selection, as well as parameter
estimation?
We can use the ML method to find the maximum likelihood straight line
from the family of straight lines. But equally, we can use the ML method
to find the maximum likelihood parabola from the family of parabolas, the
maximum likelihood cubic from the family of cubics, etc.
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Moreover, the best parabola will always have at least the likelihood, and
usually greater likelihood, than the best straight line, and the best cubic at
least the likelihood of the best parabola, and so on.
In fact, if we are prepared to choose a polynomial of sufficiently high degree,
we can choose a curve whose distance from the data is zero. If we have N
data points, a polynomial of degree N − 1 is sufficient for this.1
Yet we don’t want to say in general that our best guess at the true curve is
a polynomial of degree N − 1. To say that is to confuse signal with noise.
This is the problem of over-fitting : by concentrating on minimising the
squared distance between the true curve and the actual data observed, the
ML method gives too much weight to the data; it is, in general, insufficiently
cautious, willing to spuriously over-fit weak or non-existent patterns.
3 Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC)
How do we justify our preference for a curve of lower likelihood? We appeal
to simplicity. As we suggested in our introduction, before the middle of the
20th century, this seemed to be an appeal to aesthetic criteria, an appeal to
something beyond the data.
However, during the last 50 years, several different proposals have been
advanced for defining the simplicity of a theory in precise mathematical
terms.
Forster and Sober describe and defend one of these proposals, Akaike’s
Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike [1973]).
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AIC is a proposal for doing model selection, i.e., picking the right family of
curves. If F is a family of curves, L(F ) the maximum likelihood member
of that family, and k the number of free parameters (co-efficients) in the
family, then according to AIC we should aim to minimise this quantity:
−2 ∗ log-likelihood[L(F )] + 2k
The proposal can be described as a penalised maximum likelihood function.
The first term says that the likelihood of a family of curves goes with its
maximum likelihood member. The second term then corrects this with a
penalty proportional to the complexity of the family. Akaike’s proposal
is only one of many such proposals, which differ in how they propose to
penalise the ML estimate of the goodness-of-fit of a family of curves.
4 The Predictive Accuracy Framework
Forster ([2002], p.S160) defines a framework for philosophy of science by
asking three questions:
(1) What goal, or goals, can be achieved in science?
(2) What possible means, method, or criterion, can achieve the goal?
(3) What explanation is provided of how the means tends to achieve the
goal? Is there any account of the means → goal connection?
Forster places Akaike’s work within what he calls the predictive accuracy
framework : the postulation of the goal of predictive accuracy as the goal
of science. ‘Predictive accuracy’ is the term coined by Forster and Sober
([1994]) to describe the goal of maximising the expected log-likelihood of re-
sampled data (that is, future data sampled from the same source as the data
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we have already). This is equivalent to minimising the expected Kullback-
Leibler distance, a concept we explain in section 6.1.4.
Before proceeding any further, it’s worth commenting on an interesting slip
between questions (1) and (2) in Forster’s framework. In the first question,
Forster asks what goal or goals can be achieved in science? We think this
way of putting it, which allows for the possibility of multiple goals, is right.
But in the second question, the reference is to ‘the goal’, singular, and
Forster’s subsequent arguments defend only predictive accuracy as the single
goal of science. So it’s not clear whether Forster really believes that there
could be multiple legitimate goals for science. We certainly do.
Here’s how the Bayesian/MML approach to statistics looks in terms of
Forster’s framework: whereas Forster postulates predictive accuracy as
the single goal of science, and AIC as the means of achieving it, we offer
inference to the most probable theory as a goal of at least comparable
importance, and the method of minimising message length as the means of
achieving it. The arguments we give in this paper are intended to serve as
an account of how minimising message length achieves the goal of inference
to the most probable theory, a goal which Forster claims Bayesians cannot
achieve. In our view, prediction remains an important goal. But we claim
further that knowledge of the most probable theory gained from inference
using MML can be used to make excellent predictions, much better than
those made by AIC.
Two further points should be mentioned briefly here: Forster claims that
Akaike’s criterion provides a general means of achieving the goal of predictive
accuracy. But he is mistaken about this, as we show in section 6.1.4. In
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an interesting class of cases where the amount of data per parameter is
bounded above, you cannot achieve predictive accuracy by using Akaike’s
criterion.2Secondly, these cases cast doubt on the goal of predictive accuracy
as the single overarching goal of science, for they show that maximising
predictive accuracy can lead to statistical inconsistency in inference. This
demonstrates an importance difference between the goals of inference and
prediction in science.
5 The Minimum Message Length (MML) Principle
Before proceeding with our criticisms of AIC, it would be well to have
before us the alternative proposal we are defending, which is derived from
the principle of Minimum Message Length.3According to the principle, we
should infer the theory that allows the data to be stated in the shortest two-
part message, where the first part of the message asserts the theory, and the
second part of the message encodes the data under the assumption that the
asserted theory is true.
The fundamental idea is that compact coding theory provides the right
framework in which to think about inference and prediction (Wallace and
Boulton [1968]; Wallace and Freeman [1987]; Wallace and Dowe [1999a];
Wallace [2005]). Begin by thinking of the data as a string of symbols in a
finite alphabet. Given an estimate of parameters, we may be able to get
a briefer encoding of our data under the assumption that the estimated
parameters are the true values. A given model is only worth considering if
the shortening of the encoded data string achieved by adopting it more than
compensates for the lengthening caused by the quotation of the estimated
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parameters. Within a given model, the preferred parameter estimates are
those that lead to the shortest total encoded length. And the preferred
model amongst a class of models is the one with the shortest total two-part
message length (minimised with respect to its parameter estimates). The
method is Bayesian because it assumes known proper prior distributions
for unknown quantities. The method comes in various varieties: we shall
describe Strict MML, even though this is not computationally tractable,
except in special cases. The computationally tractable MML (Wallace and
Freeman [1987]) is derived from a quadratic Taylor series approximation of
Strict MML, and shares many of the desirable features of Strict MML.
5.1 The Strict MML estimator
A point estimation problem is a quadruple {H,X, f, p}:
H is a parameter space (assumed to be endowed with a σ-field of subsets).
X is a set of possible observations {xi : i ∈ N}.
f is a given prior probability density function with respect to a measure dh
on the parameter space H :
∫
H f(h)dh = 1.
p is the known conditional probability function p : (X,H) → [0, 1] :
p(x;h) = p(x|h), where ∑i p(xi|h) = 1, for all h ∈ H.
A solution to a point estimation problem is a function m : X → H : m(x) =
h, which given some possible observation, tells you which theory to infer
from it.
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A Bayesian solution to a point estimation problem makes essential use of
Bayes’s Theorem:
f(h|x) = p(x|h).f(h)∫
H p(x|h).f(h)dh
Conditionalising on observations, we can obtain f ∗(h), the posterior probability
density function, from f(h), the prior probability density function.
If a cost-function is known which expresses the cost of making an estimate
h′ when the true value of the parameter is h′′, then standard decision theory
allows us to calculate a minimum expected cost estimate (and so we would
have a solution to our point estimation problem).
In the absence of a cost-function, it is not clear how to proceed. Given
that the parameter space is continuous, the probability of any individual
hypothesis is 0. So we can’t use Bayes’s Theorem in order to calculate point
estimates. We might think that we can derive a point estimate from f ∗(h)
by choosing that value of h which maximises the posterior density. Alas,
however, any such “estimate” is dependent upon parametrisation.
Forster ([1995]) calls this the ‘problem of language variance’ and suggests
that, in light of considerations such as those just given, the game is more or
less up: there is no satisfactory Bayesian statistics, or, at least, none that he
knows of.4
However, all is not lost! Wallace and Boulton ([1975], ‘An Invariant Bayes
Method for Point Estimation’) describe a language invariant Bayesian
solution to the point estimation problem. Wallace, with the cooperation
of various co-workers, has since gone on to develop this Bayesian method
into an enormously powerful and well-justified approach to inference and
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prediction. Here, we shall just outline a version of the argument from
(Wallace and Boulton [1975]). We give a more technical (although still brief)
exposition in Appendix A, while a thorough exposition of the argument can
be found in (Wallace [2005], Ch. 3).
Strict MML gives us a way of dealing with any continuous or discrete prior
and still ending up with a Bayesian point estimator which is statistically
invariant and in some sense (see below) maximises the posterior probability.5
What we would like to be able to do is to choose the hypothesis with the
highest posterior probability. While we cannot do this in the continuous
case—for the reasons given above—we can do it in the discrete case. So, the
guiding idea is that we should consider a discrete problem that is a close
enough approximation to our initial point estimation problem.
To outline Strict MML, our initial objective is to construct a codebook with
the shortest expected length of a two-part message. The first part of the
message asserts a theory, while the second part of the message encodes the
data under the assumption that the theory is true. The codebook will tell
us, for any possible observation, which estimate allows the briefest encoding
of theory and data.
By virtue of the fact that all data is recorded to finite accuracy, each of the
countably many observable data has a probability (rather than a density)
of occurring. So, given the relevant likelihood functions and Bayesian prior
distributions on the parameters, we can calculate a marginal probability,
r(xi) of each possibly observable datum, xi. We note that the sum over all
data of the marginal probabilities r(xi) equals 1.
17
D
ra
ft
We partition the data into groups, always balancing the expected lengths
of the first and second parts of the message. The number of possible data
is countable, and clearly so is the number of groups. Every time a new
datum joins a group the prior probability of that group’s being chosen
goes up and the message length to encode the parameters of that group
correspondingly goes down. On the other hand, the new datum will almost
certainly cause a change in the group’s parameter estimates, not decreasing
and almost certainly increasing the expected length of encoding the values
of the previous group members using the parameter estimates.
Strict MML chooses the partition which results in the shortest expected
length over all possible two-part messages. The expectation is calculated
using the Bayesian prior probability and the marginal probability, r(xi),
of each possibly observable datum, xi. A codebook is made from this with
code-lengths, li, of events of probability, pi, given by li ≈ − log pi.6
The data is partitioned so that each possible datum appears in exactly one
group, and each group is assigned a point estimate tailor-made to best fit
(on weighted average) its group members. More explicitly, if the codebook
partitions the data into J groups {cj : j = 1, ..., J}, then the point estimate
hj for each group cj is chosen to maximise
∑
i∈cj
r(xi)f(xi|hj). (1)
Each group can be thought of as having a prior probability equal to the sum
of the marginal probabilities of all the data in the group—and, as such, the
prior probabilities of all the groups must sum to 1. We shall refer to this
prior probability of the groups (and, in turn, their parameter estimates) as
the coding prior. The partition of the possible data into groups, and the
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use of the the coding prior, together constitute an acceptable approximate
discretisation of the original continuous point estimation problem.
It is important to note that the SMML codebook described above is constructed
prior to the observation of any data, and depends only on the likelihood
functions and on Bayesian priors.
For every group and for every possible datum, xi, two-part messages exist
which encode the parameter estimates of the group in the first part of
the message, followed in the second part of the message by the xi given
those parameter estimates.7Once we have observed a datum, choosing the
estimate is simply a matter of finding out to which group the observed
datum is assigned by the codebook, and choosing the estimate for that
group. This is equivalent to using the coding prior and taking the Maximum
A Posteriori (MAP) estimate.
5.2 An example: the Binomial distribution
We will very briefly discuss an example to make clearer how the Strict
MML method works in practice.8 The problem is that of the Binomial
distribution: given a sequence of N independent trials each giving success or
failure with unknown probability of success, p, and a prior distribution h(p),
we are to estimate p. Let N = 100 and assume a uniform prior h(p) = 1
over the possible values of p. Then the possible observations are just the set
of the binary strings of length 100. The partitioning of the possible data into
groups can be carried out according to an algorithm due to Farr (Farr and
Wallace [2002]), and results in the formation of ten groups, each represented
by a single estimate. One of the two possible mirror-image solutions for the
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groups and estimates is shown in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
We can see that the initial continuous, uniform prior h(p) = 1 has been
transformed into a discrete coding prior containing just ten possible estimates.
The number of groups may seem surprisingly small and the widths of the
groups surprisingly wide. For example, any experiment which yields between
33 and 49 successes will result in the same estimate, h5 = 0.41. But in fact
h5 = 0.41 is a plausible value to infer for p if the number of successes lies
in that range. As Wallace ([2005], p.160) notes, the probability that 100
trials with p = 0.41 would yield exactly 41 successes is 0.0809, whereas
the probabilities of 33 and 49 successes are respectively 0.0218 and 0.0216,
over a quarter of the most probable value. The spacing of the estimates is
consistent with the expected error in their estimation, an important point to
which we return in section 7.2.
Table 1 also shows the difference between Strict MML and Maximum A
Posteriori (MAP) estimation. For the Binomial distribution with N trials
and s successes, and a uniform prior, the MAP estimate in this parametrisation
is equal to the Maximum Likelihood estimate, and is given by s/N . The
SMML estimate can differ significantly from this value, because of the way
the SMML procedure maps different possible observations to the same
estimate.
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5.3 Properties of the SMML estimator
5.3.1 Bayesianism
That the method described above is Bayesian is perhaps apparent enough
from the essential use it makes of prior probabilities. The length of the
first part of the message, asserting the theory, is determined by our prior
probabilities.
However, there is a more fundamental connection between Bayesianism and
the principle of minimum message length. Recall from the Introduction our
summary of Bayesian commitments: (1) the indispensability of probabilities
for characterising the degree of belief in a theory; (2) use of the Rule of
Conditionalisation to update our beliefs about a theory in the light of
new evidence; (3) the indispensability of priors. It is possible to view the
principle of minimum message length as providing independent support for
these Bayesian principles.
The connection is made via Shannon’s theory of information, in which
information is equated with the negative log of a probability. At first it
might seem that this objective measure of the information content of a
theory has little to do with our subjective degree of belief in the theory.
However, as Wallace ([2005], p.79) points out, the information content of a
message (or theory) is a subjective notion: a message that tells us something
we already knew conveys no information, while a message that tells us
something we thought improbable tells us a great deal. This provides
strong support for the idea that what we believe about theories is best
characterised in terms of (subjective) probabilities. This is the first Bayesian
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principle.
Next, let’s look at Bayes’s Rule. Suppose that you accept that the best
theory is the one that can be stated in the shortest two-part message,
where the first part of the message asserts the theory, and the second part
of the message encodes the data under the assumption that the theory
is true. For given data x, let h = m(x) be the hypothesis chosen by the
SMML estimator as best explaining that data, and q(h) be the coding prior
probability assigned to this hypothesis. Then the length of the message
asserting the theory and encoding the data is given by − log(q(h)f(x|h)),
the negative log of the joint probability of the estimate and the data.
On the other hand, the length of a message optimally encoding the data,
but without making any attempt to explain it, would be given by − log r(x),
the negative log of the marginal probability of observing the data. The
difference between these two quantities
− log q(h)f(x|h)
r(x)
, (2)
is formally identical to Bayes’s Rule of Conditionalisation.9In other words,
choosing the SMML estimate leads to a degree of belief in the estimate
chosen which is exactly described by Bayes’s Rule.
Finally, the indispensability of priors is manifested in the choice of encoding
of the first part of the message asserting the theory. So far, we have emphasised
that the choice of prior determines the optimal encoding of the assertion.
But in Shannon information theory, message lengths and negative log
probabilities are interchangeable. So one can equally say that a choice of
encoding (i.e., the choice of message length for the first part of the message)
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implicitly asserts a prior probability distribution over the theories being
considered, with Pr(asserted theory) = 2−(length of encoded assertion).
Imagine that you want to send a two-part message to a receiver. The question
naturally arises as to how to encode the first part of the message, asserting
the theory. You and the receiver of the message must agree to use some
language which you both regard as reasonably efficient for the encoding of
the theory, in the sense that theories which are more likely to be asserted
will be given shorter encodings in the language. In adopting such a language,
you and the receiver implicitly assert a prior probability distribution over
the space of possible theories.
It is true, and worth noting, that the prior probability implicitly asserted
by the choice of encoding may differ in a number of ways from the kinds
of prior probability distributions usually considered in traditional Bayesian
statistics. In the first place, such a prior may not be proper: the different
possible theories may not be assigned probabilities that collectively sum
to 1. In the second place, the prior may not have an easily expressible
mathematical form. For these reasons, Wallace ([2005], pp.148–49) draws
a distinction between prior probabilities and coding probabilities, where
the latter are probabilities implicitly asserted by a choice of encoding for
the first part of the message. Wallace notes that careful thought must be
given to the choice of encoding, with regard to what coding probabilities are
being implicitly asserted. He also shows that, if a code can be constructed
that assigns longer strings to implausible theories and shorter strings to
plausible theories, then such a code may well be an acceptable summary
of vague prior beliefs. Even if the coding probability distribution, considered
as a prior, is strictly speaking improper, its use in practice will often lead to
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acceptable, even excellent results.10
5.3.2 Language invariance
The SMML estimator is language invariant. That is, both the estimator and
the message length are unchanged by any one-to-one measure-preserving
transformation in the parametric representation of the model. It is thus
immune to the ‘problem of language variance’ often raised by Forster
(see for example [1999]; [1995], sec. 5) as a general objection to Bayesian
statistics. The model invariance of the SMML estimator follows from the
fact that transformations of the model space do not affect the model distribution,
and that the prior enters into the calculation of the message length only
via the marginal probability of the data. Hence, if we use an appropriately
transformed prior, a change in the representation of the model space has no
effect on message length.
5.3.3 Generality
The SMML method (or approximations to it, see section 5.5 below), can
be used for a wide variety of problems. In the first place, it is applicable
equally to problems of parameter estimation and model selection. This
unified treatment can be regarded not only as a strong theoretical virtue,
but one which gives demonstrably better results in practice, as we show
below. Many other methods are restricted in the classes of models to which
they can be applied. The Maximum Likelihood method requires the set of
possible models to be either countable or a continuum of fixed dimension.
That is, it cannot directly be used to choose among models with different
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numbers of parameters. Akaike’s method cannot be applied to models with
non-real valued parameters.11By contrast, the SMML method requires only
that (a) the data can be represented by a finite binary string; (b) there
exists a language for describing models of the data which is agreed to be
efficient, i.e., there exists a prior density f(h); (c) the integrals r(x) exist for
all possible data values, and satisfy r(x) > 0,
∑
X r(x) = 1.
5.3.4 Consistency and efficiency
An estimator is statistically consistent if it converges on the true distribution
given enough data. It is efficient if the rate of convergence is as fast as
possible. Starting from the basic results of information theory it can be
shown that because the SMML estimator chooses the shortest encoding of
the model and data, it must be both consistent and efficient.12These results
are (a) that the expected message length is minimised when the asserted
probability distribution agrees with the distribution of the source from
which the data actually comes, and (b) that when data from some source
is optimally encoded, the encoded string has the statistical properties of a
random sequence.
Here’s the argument. The SMML method separates data into pattern and
noise. The pattern, which describes all the information relevant to the
quantities we are estimating, is encoded in the first part of the message.
Anything that cannot be deduced from the pattern is encoded in the second
part.
Suppose on the one hand that the asserted pattern does not contain all
of the pattern information which is present in the second part. Then the
25
D
ra
ft
second part of the message will contain some pattern information and so
cannot be a random sequence. In that case, there must exist some shorter
encoding of the second part, violating the assumption that the SMML
estimator chooses the shortest encoding.
Now suppose, on the other hand, that the asserted pattern contains some
noise, i.e., information not relevant to the quantities we are estimating.
Since the estimator is a deterministic function of the data, this information
must be recoverable from the data. It follows that the noise information
in the first part of the message is redundant, since it can be deduced from
the second part of the message. Once again the assumption that the SMML
estimator chooses the shortest encoding of the data is violated.
The above argument shows that the SMML assertion contains all and
only the information relevant to knowledge of the true model that can be
extracted from the data.13
5.4 Similarity to false oracles
Wallace ([1996]) defines an oracle to be an estimator which, regardless
of the data, always gives the true parameter value (or selects the correct
model). A false oracle is an estimator such that no fair criterion can be
expected to distinguish between it and an oracle. While we cannot expect
to have access to (true) oracles, Wallace shows that we can construct false
oracles, which is the next best thing. He shows firstly that sampling from
the posterior distribution is a false oracle. Wallace ([1996], p.307) notes,
‘This may seem a strange rule compared with, say, choosing the mean,
median or mode of the posterior, but it has the advantage of being invariant
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under arbitrary measure-preserving transformations of the parameter space.’
He then shows that the Strict MML estimator closely approximates the
behaviour of a false oracle.
5.5 Approximations to SMML
The basic idea of the Strict MML estimator developed above is that one
partitions the set of possible observations into an exhaustive set of disjoint
regions. Each region is represented by a single estimate, chosen as in Eqn. 1
of section 5.1 to maximise the weighted marginal likelihood of the observations
in the region it is representing.
This procedure can be carried out if we know how to construct the correct
partition of the possible observations, can calculate the marginal probability
of observing any datum, and know how to choose the estimate to represent
each region. However, in the general case this is far from easy to do. Farr
and Wallace ([2002]) exhibit a polynomial-time algorithm for constructing
an SMML estimator for the binomial distribution, and they show that this
algorithm can be applied more generally to any estimation problem which
is one-dimensional in character. Wallace ([2005], chapter 3) has an example
of a one-dimensional problem of this type, the estimation of the mean of
a Normal distribution of known variance. More generally still, as Farr and
Wallace ([2002]) prove, construction of the SMML estimator is NP-hard.
They were, for example, unable to find a polynomial-time algorithm for the
trinomial distribution, although they were able to achieve quite good results
with an heuristic argument.
Fortunately, there are approximations to the SMML method that are
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computationally tractable. There are two basic ideas. The most computationally
intractable parts of the SMML procedure are the calculation of the marginal
probabilities of observing any data and the construction of the partition of
all possible observations. These can both be avoided if we replace reliance
on the marginal probability of the data with an approximation based on the
prior probability distribution. Secondly, we use a quadratic approximation
to the log-likelihood function log f(x|h) in the neighbourhood of parameter
vector h.14
Estimators derived using these approximations for the most part retain
the desirable properties of the SMML estimator described above, namely,
language invariance, independence from cost functions, generality (i.e.,
applicability to cases where the likelihood function has no useful maximum),
consistency and efficiency.15The estimators for the problems discussed in
section 6 are all derived from these approximations.
6 Criticisms of AIC
We turn now to direct comparisons of AIC and MML. AIC tells us to
optimise a penalised maximum-likelihood function. Our criticism of AIC
takes three forms. Firstly, there are cases where the use of any kind of
maximum likelihood function leads to problems. Secondly, there are cases
where the specific form of the penalty function chosen used by AIC to
measure the complexity of a model can be shown to be too crude. Thirdly,
since AIC is applicable only to problems containing real-valued parameters,
it cannot be be applied to the many kinds of problems where the parameters
are discrete.16
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Forster and Sober say they are impressed by the generality of AIC. We are
not. Overall, we think AIC is insufficiently general. There is nothing very
startling about this. Statistics is replete with techniques that are applicable
only within a limited range of cases. If our criticisms were purely negative,
they would not be particularly interesting. What is more significant is the
existence of an alternative method, based on the Minimum Message Length
principle, that can be successfully applied to all of the different cases that
we are about to exhibit.
6.1 Problems with Maximum Likelihood
Let’s look again at AIC. As we’ve said, it’s a technique for doing model
selection. The criterion gives us a measure of the goodness or badness of fit
of a model or family (F) to the data.
The first part of AIC says that the likelihood of the family is given by
the likelihood of the best fitting member of that family, where that is
determined by the method of Maximum Likelihood. Then you correct this
by adding a penalty for the complexity of the model.
The first thing we want to point out is: not every problem involves model
selection. Many problems are just problems of parameter estimation. For
those problems, using AIC is equivalent to using the method of Maximum
Likelihood.
But there are many problems of parameter estimation where ML gives the
wrong answers. Fundamentally, the reason for this is ML’s incaution, its
tendency to find patterns in the data that aren’t really there. This tendency
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is very pronounced when the amount of data per parameter is small. This
can happen either when the absolute amount of data itself is small, or when
the number of parameters to be estimated is large, e.g., growing with the
amount of data. We illustrate with examples of both kinds. Note that for all
of the problems discussed in this section, the MML estimators behave well
on finite samples and converge on the true parameter values in the limit.
6.1.1 Small sample bias in a Gaussian distribution
This is a well known result, and so on its own not especially impressive. But
it’s a good warm up exercise.
Consider the simple univariate Gaussian distribution with mean µ and
standard deviation σ. The probability density function for this distribution
is given by:
f(x) =
N∏
i=1
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
1
2 [
xi−µ
σ ]
2
whose negative logarithm can be written as
L = −
N∑
i=1
−1
2
log 2pi − log σ − 1
2
[
(xi − µ)
σ
]2
Taking partial derivatives of L with respect to µ and σ gives
µˆML =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi = x¯
and the sample variance σˆ2ML is given by:
σˆ2ML =
N∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2
N
It is well known that this is a biased estimator of the true variance. For
large sample sizes, the bias is quite small; for small sample sizes the bias is
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considerable. Replacing the divisor N by N − 1 gives an unbiased estimator,
but this move away from the Maximum Likelihood estimator seems ad
hoc. Sure, it works, but why does it work? Some classical statisticians
have suggested that changing the divisor to N − 1 is justified because∑N
i=1(xi − x¯)2 is distributed as a constant of proportionality (namely, the
unbiased estimate of σ2) times χ2N−1, but this special case of a fix hints
more at problems than it does at solutions in the general case.
The MML treatment of this problem is instructive. Because MML is a
Bayesian technique, the derivation of the estimator relies on the choice of
a prior. Critics of Bayesianism view this as a weakness, seeing the choice of
prior as arbitrary and difficult to justify. A typical objection in a problem
like this one might be that we have no particular reason to expect one
value of σ rather than another. Here, however, we can choose a prior that
represents an important belief that we do have about the data: that the
spread of the data is independent of the magnitude of the data, i.e., that σ
is scale-invariant. That is, we do not know, and it does not matter, whether
the data are measured in nanometres or light-years, molehills or mountains.
Hence we choose a prior which is uniform in log σ, namely, 1/σ. With this
choice of prior, µˆMML = µˆML = µˆ, and the MML estimate of σ
2,
σˆ2MML =
N∑
i=1
(xi − µˆ)2
N − 1 ,
which as we noted above is unbiased for any sample size.17Hence we see
that what looks to be a kludge from the perspective of classical statistics
is actually justified by broader principles from the perspective of MML.
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6.1.2 The von Mises circular and von Mises-Fisher spherical
distributions
The von Mises circular and von Mises-Fisher spherical distributions are
angular analogues of the Gaussian distribution. These distributions with
mean direction, µ, and concentration parameter, κ, can be thought of as
the long-term distribution of the direction of a compass needle in the plane
(for the circular distribution), or in Euclidean 3-space (for the spherical
distribution), subjected to something like magnetic field strength, κ.
κ = 0 corresponds to a uniform distribution around the circle (through
the sphere), and for large κ the distribution approximates a Gaussian
distribution with mean µ and variance, σ2 = 1/κ. The von Mises circular
distribution has been used to model protein dihedral angles (see (Wallace
and Dowe [2000]) and references therein) and hospital arrival times around a
24-hour clock.
It is generally agreed that (as with the Gaussian distribution) the best
way to estimate µ is to average the sample data—this corresponds to the
direction of a head-to-tail vector addition. The difficult issue is how to
estimate κ.
Wallace and Dowe ([1993]) considered a variety of estimation criteria for
the circular distribution, including Maximum Likelihood and MML.18 They
found that for all measurements of error (bias, absolute error, squared error
and Kullback-Leibler distance), for all (true) values of κ, for all sample
sizes, N , Maximum Likelihood, and therefore AIC, was the worst (or equal
worst)-performing method on all occasions. The differences are especially
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apparent for small sample sizes.19 By contrast, MML was in most cases the
best, and otherwise nearly the best of the estimators.
Dowe et al. ([1996]) similarly showed that ML is the worst-performing
estimation criterion, and in general MML the best, for the von Mises-Fisher
spherical distribution.
6.1.3 The Neyman-Scott problem
The small sample bias of Maximum Likelihood in the Gaussian distribution
led Neyman and Scott ([1948]) to wonder how ML would perform on a
problem where the number of data per parameter to be estimated is necessarily
small, because the number of parameters to be estimated grows with the
data.
The Neyman-Scott problem is one where we have 2N measurements arising
as 2 measurements each from N things. Given measurements {xi1, xi2 : i =
1, ..., N}, assuming xi1 and xi2 to come from a population of mean µi and
standard deviation σ (independent of i), the problem is to estimate σ and
the µi.
MML is consistent (Dowe and Wallace [1997]) but the uncorrected small
sample bias of Maximum Likelihood for the Gaussian distribution prevails
here, and we see the Maximum Likelihood estimate of σ2 inconsistently
converging to 1
2
σ2.20 Similar inconsistencies in Maximum Likelihood can be
seen on other problems where there is a finite amount of data per parameter
to be estimated, even as the number of data increases: for example, single
and multiple factor analysis21(Wallace and Freeman [1992]; Wallace [1995])
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and also for fully-parametrised mixture modelling (Wallace ([2005], Ch. 6.8);
Wallace and Dowe ([2000], sec. 4.3)).
6.1.4 Neyman-Scott, predictive accuracy and Minimum Expected
Kullback-Leibler Distance
Strict MML and its approximations are not the only statistically invariant
Bayesian methods of point estimation. Another is the Minimum Expected
Kullback-Leibler Distance (MEKLD) estimator (Kullback and Leibler
[1951]; Dowe et al. [1998]; Wallace [2005], pp.205–209). The Kullback-
Leibler (KL) distance is a measure of the difference between two probability
distributions for the same variable. Let a(x) and b(x) be two probability
distributions of a discrete random variable x. Then the KL-distance of b()
from a() is defined as
KLD(a, b) =
∑
x
a(x) log(a(x)/b(x))
The KL-distance is a measure of how surprising observed values of x will
appear if we think they are being generated according to b() when in fact
they come from a(). Because it is invariant under re-parametrisation, the
KL-distance is useful as a general purpose cost-function, giving the cost of
mistaking a() for b(). Of course, we do not in general know what the true
distribution a() is, and so we cannot calculate directly how far away from it
is some other distribution, b(), that we have estimated from the data. But
we can minimise the expected cost with respect to the posterior distribution
of the true value. This MEKLD estimate is also called a predictive distribution;
it is the maximum expected log-likelihood estimate based, not on the data
we have, but on what data we might expect to get from the same source.
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According to the predictive accuracy framework advocated by Forster,
finding this estimate is the goal of science, and AIC is the means to achieve
this goal.
The Neyman-Scott problem raises difficulties for both of these claims. If
AIC provides the means to achieve predictive accuracy, then the estimates
recommended by AIC should converge to MEKLD estimates. As with all
the problems discussed in this section, the estimates recommended by AIC
are just those derived using the method of Maximum Likelihood. For the
Neyman-Scott problem, ML inconsistently over -fits the data, with σˆ2ML →
1
2
σ2, MML consistently converges on σ2, while MEKLD inconsistently
under -fits the data, with σˆ2MEKLD → 32σ2 (Wallace [2005], p.207). So even
if we accept the goal of predictive accuracy, AIC is not the means to achieve
that goal.
The Neyman-Scott problem also casts doubt on the adequacy of predictive
accuracy as the single goal of statistics, because it shows an interesting
distinction between inference and prediction. We just noted above that
MEKLD under-fits the data, that is, it overestimates the value of σ. This
is not to say that MEKLD is failing in its task. While MEKLD is overly
conservative in terms of inference, in terms of expected predictive error it
makes perfectly good sense to let all theories have their say and consequently,
to overestimate the noise term. Our position is not that inference is better
than prediction, only that they can be different things. If you have some
data for the Neyman-Scott problem and you want to minimise the surprise
you get when you see new data, you should use the predictive distribution.
But if you are interested in inferring the source from which the data actually
came, then MML is the method you need.
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An example may help clarify the distinction. Say you want to predict
tomorrow’s maximum temperature. Today it’s hot, but there’s a strong
cold front on its way. However, it’s hard to know exactly when the front will
arrive. According to your weather model, if the front arrives early tomorrow,
temperatures will be cool, with a maximum of 20◦C, whereas if the front
arrives late, the maximum temperature will be 30◦C. According to your
model, there’s a 40% chance that the front arrives early. What should your
prediction be? If you want to minimise your surprise on learning what the
temperature was, you should predict a maximum temperature of 26◦C, even
though you are almost certain that the maximum temperature will not
have this value. If the cost of being wrong is proportional to your distance
from the right answer, this prediction makes sense. However, if it is more
important to get the right answer, you should predict a temperature of
30◦C.22
6.2 Other problems with AIC
The preceding criticisms of AIC may strike some readers as unfair, since
the difficulties encountered are actually difficulties with the Maximum
Likelihood method of estimating parameters, whereas AIC is being advanced
as a method of doing model selection. However, it is not so easy to get AIC
off the hook. AIC maximises a penalised maximum likelihood function. Any
problems with maximum likelihood are therefore going to be conceptual
problems for AIC. In addition, the problems with ML identified above will
become problems for AIC as soon as AIC is asked to discriminate between
different models, some or all of which take these forms.
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In any case, not all of the problems with AIC can be attributed to difficulties
with the method of Maximum Likelihood. In this section we demonstrate
several problems in which AIC performs very badly in selecting a model,
even where Maximum Likelihood or similar related methods can be used to
estimate the parameters of the model. These cases show that the penalty
function used in AIC to balance model complexity against goodness-of-fit
with the data is too crude to work effectively in many commonly occurring
statistical problems.
6.2.1 Univariate polynomial regression
The key model selection problem discussed in (Forster and Sober [1994]) is
that of univariate polynomial regression, which they call the ‘curve-fitting
problem’. In this problem, the task is to choose the degree of a polynomial
approximation to an unknown function. It is specifically to this problem
that Forster claims Akaike has provided the solution.
Wallace ([1997]) compares the performance of five methods for selecting the
order of a polynomial approximation to a function. The methods compared
include AIC and MML.23 The tests were conducted as follows: we have
some unknown target function, t(x).24 We are given some training data
comprising N pairs {xn, yn : n = 1, . . . , N}, where the x-values are chosen
randomly from the Uniform distribution on [-1,1], and the y-values are given
by yn = t(xn) + εn, where each of the noise values {εn : n = 1, . . . , N} are
selected from a Gaussian distribution of zero mean and unknown variance,
v.
The task is to construct some polynomial function f(d, x) of degree d
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which may be used to predict the value of t(x) in the interval [-1,1]. Only
polynomials of degree up to 20 are considered, and for any degree, only the
polynomial which minimises the squared error on the training data (i.e., the
maximum likelihood polynomial) is considered. The model selection problem
is thereby reduced to the choice of degree, d.
The success of the chosen approximation is measured by its Expected
Squared Prediction Error, i.e. the average value of [f(d, x)−t(x)]2, estimated
using a Monte Carlo estimate as
ESPE[f(d, x)] =
1
M
M∑
m=1
[f(d, xm)− t(xm)]2
with the test points {xm : m = 1, . . . ,M} chosen randomly and uniformly
in [-1,1]. A test consists of 1000 cases of this kind, and the ESPE is averaged
over the 1000 cases.
[Table 2 about here.]
The results clearly show that AIC is not competitive with MML, except
under the very favourable conditions of low noise nd large sample, where
the methods give similar results. The difference between the two methods is
especially stark when the amount of data is small. The results of one such
experiment are shown in Table 2, adapted from (Wallace [1997]).25 This
experiment shows the average results over 1000 cases for approximation of
a trigonometric function with only 10 data points,26 under conditions of low
noise. The first row of the table shows the average ESPE (AV), followed
by its standard deviation (SD), and percentile points and maximum of the
ESPE distribution over the cases. Finally, the average ESPE is shown for
those cases where a method has selected a polynomial of particular degree
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(avERR), together with the number of times it chose that degree (CNT).
AIC’s pronounced tendency to over-fit the data is clear from the table.
While both AIC and MML chose a 6th-degree polynomial more often than
any other, AIC’s other choices were heavily weighted towards the higher
degrees. In 1000 cases, AIC never selected a polynomial of degree zero or
one, whereas MML selected one of these on 255 occasions. AIC chose the
highest possible 8th-degree polynomial 154 times, as against 10 times for
MML.
The tendency to overfit is reflected in the average errors. We can see from
the table that the average ESPE for AIC is nearly a hundred times greater
than that for MML, and that AIC’s worst case is more than two hundred
times worse than MML’s worst case.
Nor is this case particularly unusual among the many different trials conducted
in (Wallace [1997]). In general, the average squared prediction error for AIC
is orders of magnitude greater than that for MML. Moreover, the great
superiority of MML over AIC in these tests cannot be attributed to the
use of helpful priors: the only prior beliefs assumed are that all degrees are
equally likely, and that the signal and noise are likely to be of similar size.
These assumptions are at best uninformative and at worst misleading in this
context.
6.2.2 Autoregressive econometric time series
Econometric autoregression has quite a bit in common with univariate
polynomial regression. Univariate polynomial regression consists of regressing
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a variable on polynomial powers of another variable and a noise term.
Econometric autoregression consists of regressing a variable on lags of itself
(which can be thought of as powers of the Backshift operator: B(xt) =
xt−1, B2(xt) = xt−2, . . .) and a noise term.
The study in (Fitzgibbon et al. [2004]) compares several criteria, including
AIC, a corrected version of AIC (AICc), and an MML estimator.
27The
comparison was performed by using Maximum Likelihood to estimate the
parameters for each of the models, with the different criteria then being
used to select the model order. In all cases, MML was the best at choosing
the model order and the one most prone to under-estimating the model
order while AIC was the worst at choosing the model order and the one
most prone to over-estimating the model order. With T being the training
sample size and the Mean Squared Prediction Error (MSPE) for model
order p with parameters (φ1, . . . , φp) being given by
MSPE(p) =
1
T
2T∑
i=T+1
(yi − (φˆ1yi−1 + . . .+ φˆpyi−p))2
in all cases, MML gave the least squared prediction error and AIC gave the
largest squared prediction error.
6.2.3 Multivariate second-order polynomial model selection
A variation of the polynomial regression problem arises when the order
of the model is fixed and known, while the models vary in selecting from
among a large set of variables. The task is both to select the correct variables
and to determine how the chosen variables influence the model directly and
in collaboration with other variables.
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Rumantir and Wallace ([2003]) discuss this problem as it arises in the
context of predicting the intensity of tropical cyclones. The order of the
model is presumed to be a second-order polynomial, while the models
vary in selecting from among 36 variables, representing a wide variety of
meteorological, geographical and hydrological data. Rumantir and Wallace
compare twelve different model selection techniques, including MML and
AIC, using both artificially generated and real data. MML was found
reliably to converge to the true model for the artificially generated data,
and to a reasonably parsimonious model when tested on real data. Indeed,
MML was shown to outperform existing cyclone prediction techniques, and
to discover new and useful regularities in the data. The models selected by
AIC on the artificial data were found to have over-fitted the data. AIC was
not sufficiently competitive with the other techniques to warrant its being
tested on the real data.
6.2.4 Gap or no gap: A clustering-like problem for AIC
The last statistical problem to be discussed in this section is a new problem
which has not (to our knowledge) previously been discussed in the literature.
Suppose that we have to select between the following two models: either a
quantity is uniformly distributed over [0, 1], or else it is uniformly distributed
over the intervals [0, a] ∪ [b, 1], where 0 < a < b < 1. (In this second
case, there is a gap—the interval (a, b) —over which the quantity is absent.)
Although this problem is different from, and simpler than, typical problems
studied in statistical mixture modelling, clustering, numerical taxonomy,
and intrinsic classification, we choose it because it shows a weakness of AIC
in an instructive way.
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Suppose that we have N data points. The expected average gap size is 1/N
and the expected size of the largest gap is (logN)/N (see Appendix B.1 for
a proof).
Consider the case in which b = a + (logN)/N . As we show in Appendix
B.2, in this case AIC inconsistently prefers the gappy model to the model
without the gap, even though a gap of this size is just what we would expect
if the data actually came from a distribution with no gap in it. By contrast,
as we show in Appendix B.3, in this case MML correctly prefers the no-gap
model. We also show that MML will not prefer the gappy model until the
size of the largest gap in the data is approximately (2 logN)/N .28
In defence of AIC, it might be pointed out that AIC’s estimate of the
gap size tends to zero as the number of data approaches infinity. But any
tendency to overestimate the gap size—and especially inconsistently so—
augurs particularly badly for AIC, since one of the stated aims of AIC is
to maximise the predictive accuracy (i.e., minimise the KL-distance). Yet
overestimation of the gap size gives an infinite KL-distance.
6.3 Conclusions from the comparison of MML and AIC
In this section we have compared the performance of MML and AIC on
a wide variety of statistical problems. We conclude the section with a
summary of the three most significant implications arising from the comparison.
First, the very great superiority of MML over AIC in the inference problems
examined should be apparent. MML can be used to do either parameter
estimation or model selection. Where the problem is parameter estimation
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(the Gaussian distribution, the von Mises circular and von Mises-Fisher
spherical distributions, the Neyman-Scott problem), AIC is equivalent
to Maximum Likelihood estimation, which either performs badly or is
inconsistent on these problems. MML provides consistent estimates of the
parameters in each case.
Where the problem is model selection (univariate polynomial regression,
econometric time series autoregression, multivariate second-order polynomial
model selection, the gap/no gap problem), AIC is either inconsistent or very
bad at choosing the model order, while MML performs well.
Second, Forster ([2002], pp.S129–31) has in the past defended AIC against
claims of inconsistency. But we are not merely repeating claims that Forster
has already rebutted. Forster’s defence of AIC concerns the alleged inconsistency
of AIC on only one of the problems we have discussed here, that of univariate
polynomial regression. We were careful not to repeat the charge; on that
problem we claimed only that the performance of MML is orders of magnitude
better than that of AIC, not that AIC is inconsistent. In fact, we accept
Forster’s defence of the consistency of AIC on this problem, since it is
similar to that which we give for Strict MML below in section 7.1.29
However, Forster’s defence of AIC on the problem of univariate polynomial
regression is specific to that problem and will not generalise to other problems.
For example, it cannot be used to defend AIC against the charge that it
inconsistently prefers the gappy model in the gap/no gap problem. Nor to
our knowledge, has Forster ever considered the important class of cases,
represented in this paper by the Neyman-Scott problem but also including
single and multiple factor analysis and fully-parametrised mixture modelling,
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in which the amount of data per parameter is bounded above. In these
problems, Maximum Likelihood, and hence AIC, is inconsistent, MML
consistent.
Third, the Neyman-Scott problem and the other finite data per parameter
problems have highly significant implications for Forster’s defence of the
goal of predictive accuracy as the goal of statistics. These problems show
an important and under-appreciated distinction between inference and
prediction: minimising the error in one’s predictions of future data is not
the same as inferring the true model. It’s not that Forster is unaware of this
distinction (see, for example Forster [2001], p.95). But since he believes that
Bayesian inference is impossible, he has concluded—too quickly, we think—
that the field has been left clear for predictive accuracy to claim as its own.
What we take ourselves to have shown here is that Bayesian inference is a
viable goal for statistics, and that predictive accuracy cannot be a substitute
for it. We discuss this point in more detail below in section 7.2.
Two final points: while either prediction or inference can be legitimate goals
for statistics, it is important to suit one’s means to one’s goals: maximising
predictive accuracy in Neyman-Scott leads to inconsistent estimates (and,
therefore, inferences). If you want to maximise predictive accuracy, you
should minimise the expected Kullback-Leibler distance (MEKLD); if you
want the best inference, you should use MML. Finally, it is important to
note that on the Neyman-Scott problem, AIC does not converge on the
MEKLD estimate, and hence does not deliver predictive accuracy: while
MEKLD overestimates the noise in the data, and MML correctly estimates
the noise, ML (and hence AIC) underestimates it.
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7 Meeting Forster’s objections to Bayesianism
We have already seen above how the method of minimising message length
is immune to the problem of language variance. In this section, we show how
MML enables Bayesians to meet two other objections frequently raised by
Forster against Bayesian statistics.
7.1 The sub-family problem
The sub-family problem is a generalised version of the curve-fitting problem.
Consider any model selection problem in which one family of models, A,
is a subset of another family, B. Then for any consistent assignment of
priors and for any possible data, p(B| data) ≥ p(A| data). How, ask Forster
and Sober (Forster and Sober [1994]; Forster [2000], p.214), can Bayesians
explain the fact we sometimes prefer model family A to model family B?
On the face of it, the SMML estimator described above is vulnerable to
this objection. The reason is that in its purest form, the first part of a
message constructed according to the strict MML procedure makes no
reference to families of models. The SMML estimator is not interested in
families of models per se. It partitions the data into subsets each of which
is represented by an estimate, which is to say, by a fully specified model.
So consider a case of the curve-fitting problem where the true curve is a
second degree polynomial (with Gaussian noise added). If asked to select
the best curve to account for some data from among all polynomials of,
say, degree 8 or less, the particular estimate chosen according to the SMML
method is likely to fall very near those axes of the parameter space where
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the higher order co-efficients have values of zero, but it is unlikely to fall
precisely on those axes. So the SMML estimator will typically select a
polynomial of degree 8, without noticing that the co-efficients of all the
terms in x3 and higher are very close to zero. Thus, while the polynomial
chosen as the SMML estimate will, across the range of the data, be virtually
indistinguishable from a quadratic, it will not actually be a quadratic.
How then can the Bayesian solve the sub-family problem? There is a clue
to the answer in the description of the problem. Why in the case described
above does the SMML estimator choose a high-degree polynomial? Because
it is not interested in families of models, only in fully specified models. If
we are interested in the question of which is the simplest family of models
containing the true model, then we can modify the SMML estimator to
direct its attention to that question. As it happens, this can be achieved
by a simple modification: we modify the first part of the message so that
a model family is asserted. The first part of the message now consists of
a statement of the model family, followed by a statement fully specifying
the parameters of the chosen family. This modified form of the estimator
results in a negligible increase in expected message length and is essentially
equivalent30to that used in the comparison reported on in section 6.2.1,
where the superior performance of MML shows that the estimator successfully
solves the curve-fitting problem.
The treatment of this specific problem illustrates the general form of the
answer to the sub-family problem within the Bayesian/MML framework.
Since models from family B are more complex than those from family A,
asserting a model from family B will lengthen the first part of the message.
If this lengthening is not compensated for by a greater shortening in the
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second part of the message—as will be the case if the extra complexity in
model family B brings no extra explanatory power—then MML will prefer
the simpler model from family A as its explanation of the data. And this is
true notwithstanding the fact that model family B has overall the higher
posterior probability. In general, the MML estimate is not equal to the
mode of the posterior.
7.2 The problem of approximation, or, which framework for
statistics?
At bottom, the competition between MML and AIC is not just a disagreement
about which of two statistical methods is superior. There is, as Forster has
noted, a fundamental disagreement about the right framework for doing
statistics, a disagreement about what statisticians should be trying to do.
Forster defends the predictive accuracy framework. In this framework, the
basic object of interest is the model family, and the basic aim is prediction.
In the Bayesian/MML framework, the basic object of interest is the fully
specified model, and the basic aim is inference.
This is not to say that in the Bayesian/MML view, prediction is not a
legitimate goal of statistics. It is to say that we are sometimes legitimately
interested in which fully specified model is most probably true, and not
nearly so much in inferring from which class of models that theory comes,
or in predicting what future data sampled from a posterior distribution over
that class of models would look like.31
Why does Forster think we should be interested in model families rather
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than in fully specified models? Forster gives two related arguments for
preferring the predictive accuracy framework. Firstly, he objects to the
Bayesian framework because there is no sensible way to define the probability
that a fully specified model (with at least one real-valued parameter) is
exactly true. As a result, he thinks that the predictive accuracy framework
is truer to the way real scientists behave.
Here is Forster’s first argument:
‘We work with families of curves because they deliver the most reliable
estimates of the predictive accuracy of a few curves; namely their best
fitting cases. There is no reason to suspect that such an enterprise can
be construed as maximising the probability that these best fitting cases
are true. Why should we be interested in the probability of these curves’
being true, when it is intuitively clear that no curve fitting procedure
will ever deliver curves that are exactly true? If we have to live with false
hypotheses, then it may be wise to lower our sights and aim at hypotheses
that have the highest possible predictive accuracy.’ (Forster and Sober
[1994], p.26, emphasis in the original)
As we’ve already noted, we agree with Forster that no method of statistical
induction delivers inferences that are exactly true of fully-specified models
with real-valued parameters.32 However, what if there were a method
capable of delivering inferences which are approximately true?
Forster ([2000], p.214) considers a crude version of this suggestion, where a
theory is considered to be approximately true if the true values of parameters
differ only infinitesimally from the asserted values. Forster rightly dismisses
this attempt;33 we agree with him that the idea of infinitesimal closeness is
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not the right way to define what it means for a theory to be approximately
true.
However, Forster concludes from this that no better definition of what it
means for a theory to be approximately true is available to the Bayesian
(or to anyone). His pessimistic response to this (‘If we have to live with
false hypotheses, then it may be wise to lower our sights...’) is to give up
entirely on the idea of inferring the best fully-specified model, and move to a
framework within which the focus of interest is on model families instead of
fully specified models.
We think this pessimism is hasty and unfounded. The Minimum Message
Length Principle provides a rigorous, consistent and useful way of defining
the approximate truth of theories. This is possible because there is a trade-
off involved in choosing the precision of an estimate. On the one hand, if
the estimates are stated too coarsely, then although the first part of the
message, asserting some particular estimate, will be short, the second part
of the message, encoding the data values, will have to be longer, because
more information is required to locate the values within the large region
represented by the coarsely stated estimate. On the other hand, if the
estimates are stated too precisely, the length of the first part of the message
will be unnecessarily lengthened by redundant information.
The result of the trade-off is that MML methods deliver point estimates
stated to a precision consistent with the expected error in their estimation. It
is in this sense that the assertion of a theory chosen by an MML estimator
is approximately true: the data give us no reason for being any more (or
less) precise in our estimates.
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The availability of this Bayesian method of point estimation undermines
Forster’s second argument:
‘The goals of probable truth and predictive accuracy are clearly different,
and it seems that predictive accuracy is the one that scientists care about
most. Wherever parameter values are replaced by point estimates, there
is zero chance of that specific value being the true one, yet scientists
are not perturbed by this. Economists don’t care if their predictions of
tomorrow’s stock prices are exactly right; being close would still produce
huge profits. Physicists don’t care whether their estimate of the speed of
light is exactly right, so long as it has a high degree of accuracy. Biologists
are not concerned if they fail to predict the exact corn yield of a new
strain, so long as they are approximately right. If the probability of truth
were something that they cared about, then point estimation would be a
puzzling practice. But if predictive accuracy is what scientists value, then
their methodology makes sense.’ (Forster [2001], p.95)
Since the point estimate asserted by an MML estimator is stated only to
a precision warranted by the data, we can see that this argument relies
on a false contrast. Scientists can care about probability of truth and still
use theories that they know to be only approximately true. The MML
framework thus preserves the strong intuition that scientists care about
getting to the truth, that is, inferring the model from which the data actually
came.
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8 Conclusion
The mathematical formalisation of the notion of theoretical simplicity is
an exciting development for statistics, with profound implications for both
statistical theory and practice, and for philosophy of science.
In this paper we have argued for the theoretical and empirical superiority of
the Bayesian method of Minimum Message Length over the non-Bayesian
Akaike Information Criterion, defended by Malcolm Forster and Elliott
Sober. The theoretical arguments show that MML is a consistent and
invariant Bayesian procedure. It is thus immune to the problem of language
variance raised by Forster and Sober as a general objection to Bayesianism.
It is also a general method, one which has been applied successfully to
problems of a wide range of statistical forms, and originating in many
different fields. It can be used for model selection and for parameter estimation,
regardless of whether the parameters are continuous or discrete. AIC, by
contrast, can only be used for model selection problems with continuous
parameters, as far as we know.
Our empirical arguments show that even in those cases where AIC can be
applied, in every case where AIC and MML have been directly compared,
MML outperforms AIC. For example, in the key case of univariate polynomial
regression (the “curve fitting problem”), AIC is not competitive with MML
except under favourable conditions of low noise and large sample. For
autoregressive time-series, and for the von-Mises circular and von-Mises-
Fisher spherical distributions, the performance of AIC is even worse, being
unable to compete with MML at all.
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Of special significance is the Neyman-Scott problem, an example of an
important class of cases where the amount of data per parameter to be
estimated is bounded above. These cases show the inadequacy of the predictive
accuracy framework advocated by Forster and Sober: if we aim to maximise
the expected log-likelihood of re-sampled data, we end up with inconsistent
estimates. By contrast, MML gives consistent estimates in the Neyman-
Scott problem and similar cases.
Having laid out the many advantages of the Bayesian MML approach over
the non-Bayesian AIC approach, we leave the reader with Dowe’s question
((Dowe et al. [1998], p.93); (Wallace and Dowe [1999a], p.282); (Wallace and
Dowe [2000], sec. 5); (Comley and Dowe [2005], sec. 11.3.1)) as to whether
only MML and closely related Bayesian methods can, in general, infer fully
specified models with both statistical consistency and invariance. Even
if non-Bayesian methods can achieve this, we doubt that they will be as
efficient as MML.
Appendices
A Details of the derivation of the Strict MML estimator
We begin by observing that the set of possible observations, X, is countable.
This must be so because any apparatus that we can construct with which to
take measurements can do so only with finite accuracy.
We also observe that the number of actual observations must be finite. Since
a countable quantity raised to the power of a finite quantity is countable, it
follows that the set of distinct hypotheses that the data could justify us in
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making, H∗ = {m(x) : x ∈ X}, is also countable, i.e. H∗ = {hj : j ∈ N}.
For example, if want to estimate the probability that a coin lands heads
from the number of heads in a sequence of 100 tosses, it would not make
sense to consider more than 101 different estimates of the bias of the coin,
because there are only 101 different possible observations we could make.
Since the number of assertable estimates is countable, we can define
cj = {i : m(xi) = hj} for each hj ∈ H∗, and C = {cj : hj ∈ H∗}.
That is, each cj is a group of possible data points, with all the points in
the group being mapped by the estimator m to a single estimate, hj. C is
the set of these data groups, which together form a partition of the data
space. Given some set of assertable estimates H∗ as defined above, we assign
non-zero prior probabilities to the members of H∗—constrained by the prior
density function—and then, for each x ∈ X, choose h ∈ H∗ to maximise
p(h|x). This defines m∗ : X → H∗, and so shows the existence in theory of
a solution to our point estimation problem, {H,X, f, p}, provided that we
have selected the right H∗. We now consider how best to choose H∗.
For all j, let qj =
∑
i∈cj m(xi) be the prior probability assigned to hj, which
in sec. 5.1 we called the coding prior. We must have
∑
j qj = 1 and qj > 0
for all j. Moreover, if i ∈ cj then p(xi|hj)qj ≥ p(xi|hj′)qj′ for all i and
j 6= j′. That is, given a set of data points all of which are mapped to a
single estimate hj, no other choice of estimate in H
∗ gives a greater joint
probability of estimate and data.
To get a good approximation, perhaps the best approach would be to
compare r(xi) =
∫
H p(xi|h)f(h)dh, the marginal probability of making some
observation, with r∗(xi) =
∑
j p(xi|hj)qj =
∑
j b(hj, xi). Each b(hj, xi) is the
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joint probability of the estimate hj and a datum xi. r
∗(xi) is therefore the
marginal probability of datum xi given the coding prior. However, we shall
instead maximise an average of b(x, h) over all x.
Suppose that we conduct N trials, with observations Y = {y1, . . . , yn, . . . , yN},
parameter values G = {g1, . . . , gn, . . . , gN}, and estimated values K =
{k1, . . . , kn, . . . , kN}. The joint probability of Y and G, J(G, Y ) =∏N
n=1 b(gn, yn).
Our aim will be to choose the discrete model of the problem and the estimate
sequence, K, so as to give the highest possible joint probability, i.e. to
choose the model and K to maximise J(K,Y ) =
∏N
n=1 b(kn, yn).
34
Let Di be the number of times xi occurs in Y , for all i. Then J(K,Y ) =∏
i{b(m(xi), xi)}Di , where m is some yet-to-be determined function.
Now, if N is large enough, then Di ≈ Nr(xi). So, we aim to choose the
model H∗ and m to maximise:
B=
1
N
∑
i
Nr(xi) log b(m(xi), xi)
=
∑
j
(
∑
i∈cj
r(xi) log qj) +
∑
j
(
∑
i∈cj
r(xi) log p(xi|hj))
The first term gives the negative expected length of the assertion of the
model, and the second term gives the negative expected length of the data,
encoded under the assumption that the asserted model is the true model.
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B MML, AIC and the Gap vs. No Gap Problem
We have data {0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 : i = 1...N}. Each of the xi are stated to some
accuracy ε > 0.35We are to decide whether the data come from a uniform
distribution over the interval [0,1] with no gap, or from a uniform distribution
over [0, a] ∪ [b, 1], 0 < a < b < 1, where there is an interval (a, b) over which
the quantity is absent.
B.1 Expected size of the largest gap
We begin by showing that the expected size of the largest gap between
two of N data points from the non-gappy distribution is approximately
(logN)/N .
To get things started, we assume that the N data points come approximately
from a negative exponential distribution, with rate r = N + O(
√
N) ≈ N ;
whereupon r/N = 1 + O(1/
√
N) = N/r and limN→∞ r/N = 1 =
limN→∞N/r.
The points are therefore uniformly distributed in [0, 1] and the average gap
size is 1/N . Then,
Pr(largest gap ≤ y)=Pr(all gaps ≤ y) = [Pr(a random gap ≤ y)]N
=
[∫ y
0
Ne−tN dt
]N
=
[∫ yN
0
e−u du
]N
=(1− e−yN)N
We now introduce a few results to be used in the rest of this appendix. As is
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well known,
lim
M→∞
(
1 +
k
M
)M
= ek, and (B.1)
lim
M→∞
(M + 2)2
M2
= 1 (B.2)
We also make use of a result suggested to us by Ge´rald R. Petit, generalising
B.1 to the case of f(M) = o(
√
M), i.e., where limM→∞
f(M)√
M
= 0:
lim
M→∞
(
1 + f(M)
M
)M
ef(M)
= 1 (B.3)
Letting γ(y,N) = eNy/N and so y = (log γN)/N, 0 < γ <∞,
in the special case that y = 0 then γ = 1/N and
Pr(largest gap ≤ y) = Pr(largest gap ≤ 0) = 0 = limN→∞ e−N =
limN→∞ e−1/γ.
Otherwise, for y > 0, noting that −1/γ = −N/eNy = o(√N) for each y in
turn, by equation (B.3) we have that for each y > 0,
Pr(largest gap ≤ y) = (1− e−(N log γN)/N)N
= (1− e−(log γ+logN))N
= (1− 1/γN)N
→ e−1/γ in the asymptotic limit of large N . (B.4)
Eqn. B.4 is a cumulative distribution for the size of the largest gap. Differentiating
Eqn. B.4 can similarly be shown to give the distribution for the largest gap
itself; we can then find the expectation of this distribution.
f(γ) =
∂
∂γ
[
Pr
(
largest gap ≤ y = logN + log γ
N
)]
→ ∂
∂γ
e−1/γ
=
1
γ2
e−1/γ (B.5)
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Since 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 and y(γ) is a continuous bounded function of γ for 0 < γ ≤
eN
N
, the expected size of the largest gap, E[f(γ)], is
E[f(γ)] =
∫ ∞
0
f(γ) y(γ) dγ
=
∫ ∞
0
f(γ)
log γ + logN
N
dγ
=
logN
N
∫ ∞
0
f(γ) dγ +
1
N
∫ ∞
0
f(γ) log γ dγ
=
logN
N
+
1
N
∫ ∞
0
O(1)
e−1/γ
γ2
× log γ dγ
=
logN
N
+O(
1
N
)
≈ logN
N
I.e., lim
N→∞
N
logN
E[f(γ)] = 1 (B.6)
B.2 Performance of AIC on the Gap vs. No Gap Problem
Recall that AIC minimises 2 log(L(F )) + 2k, where k is the number of
estimated parameters, and L(F ) the member of the family of curves that
best fits the data. (By contrast, maximum likelihood minimises log(L(F )).
AIC differs from maximum likelihood by the inclusion of the penalty function
+2k.)
We consider a case in which b = a + (logN)/N . The likelihood function
is
[
1− logN
N
]N
for the gappy model (for which k = 2), and 1N for the non-
gappy model (for which k = 0).
So, on the one hand, AICNG = −2 log(1N) + 2× 0 = 0.
On the other hand,
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AICG=2N log(1− (b− a)) + 2× 2
≈ 2N log(1− logN
N
) + 4
= 2N(− logN
N
+
1
2
(
logN
N
)2
+ · · · ) + 4
=−2 logN + (logN)
2
N
+ · · ·+ 4
< 0, for moderately sized N.
So AIC selects the model with the gap.36
B.3 Performance of MML in the Gap vs. No Gap Problem
To encode the models, we employ the following coding scheme: we use 1 bit
(= loge 2 nits
37) to indicate which of the two models is being used, then we
encode the parameters of the model (none for the no-gap model, the two
parameters a and b for the gappy model), then we encode the data.
For sufficiently small ε, the message length for the no-gap model is given
straightforwardly by:
LNG =
model︷ ︸︸ ︷
log 2 +
parameters︷︸︸︷
0
data︷ ︸︸ ︷
−N log ε . (B.7)
For the gappy model (see Figure 1), we must decide to what precision to
state the parameters of the model a and b. Initially, let us say that we state
a to precision δ1 and b to δ2.
Then the message length for the gappy model is given by:
LG =
model︷ ︸︸ ︷
log 2
parameters38︷ ︸︸ ︷
− log δ1 − log δ2 − log 2
data︷ ︸︸ ︷
−N log ε+N log(1− [(b− δ2)− (a+ δ1)])
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Assume (from symmetry) that δ1 = δ2 =
δ
2
. So39
LG = −2 log δ
2
−N log ε+N log(1− [(b− a)− δ]). (B.8)
[Figure 1 about here.]
We wish to choose δ to minimise LG. Solving
0 =
∂LG
∂δ
= −2
δ
+
N
1− [(b− a)− δ] ,
we find that LG is minimised when
δ =
2[1− (b− a)]
N − 2 , for N ≥ 3. (B.9)
Given N, we wish to know for what size gap MML will prefer the gappy
model to the no-gap model. This is equivalent to asking at what point the
message lengths LG and LNG are the same. Subtracting B.7 from B.8 we get
the expression
LG − LNG=−2 log δ
2
−N log ε+N log(1− [(b− a)− δ])
− log 2 +N log ε
=−2 log δ
2
+N log(1− [(b− a)− δ])− log 2
Substituting δ = 2[1−(b−a)]
N−2 from equation B.9 above, and letting the
expression equal zero, we get:
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0 = LG − LNG=− log 2− 2 log 1− (b− a)
N − 2
+N log
[
(1− (b− a))
(
1 +
2
N − 2
)]
=−2 log(1− (b− a)) + 2 log(N − 2) +N log(1− (b− a))
+N logN −N log(N − 2)− log 2
= (N − 2) log(1− (b− a))− (N − 2) log(N − 2)
+N logN − log 2
= (N − 2) log (1− (b− a))
N − 2 +N logN − log 2
= 2 logN + (N − 2) log N(1− (b− a))
N − 2 − log 2
Exponentiating, and given N , we seek (b− a) satisfying
1 = e0= 1
2
N2 ·
[
N(1− (b− a))
N − 2
]N−2
1= 1
2
N2 · (1− (b− a))N−2 ·
[
N
N − 2
]N−2
1= 1
2
N2 · (1− (b− a))N−2 ·
[
1 +
2
N − 2
]N−2
For N ≥ 3, we can let M = N − 2, and say that
1=
M2(M + 2)2
2M2
· (1− (b− a))M ·
[
1 +
2
M
]M
(B.10)
Using equations B.1 and B.2 we can rewrite equation B.10 as follows:
lim
M→∞
1
2
M2e2(1− (b− a))M = 1, (B.11)
and using equation B.3 it now follows that
lim
M→∞
[
(1 + 2
M
)(1 + 2 logM
M
)
]M
e2M2
= 1.
Therefore, equation B.11 can be rewritten as
lim
M→∞
1
2
[
(1 +
2
M
)(1 +
2 logM
M
)(1− M(b− a)
M
)
]M
= 1. (B.12)
Expanding,
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lim
M→∞
1
2
[
1 +
1
M
(−M(b− a) + 2 + 2 logM)
+
1
M2
(−2M(b− a)− 2M(b− a) logM + 4 logM)
+
1
M3
(4M(b− a) logM)
]M
= 1.
Under the very reasonable assumption that M(b − a) = o(√M), the terms
in 1
M2
and 1
M3
are small enough to be ignored, and we can re-apply Petit’s
result in equation B.3, letting f(M) = −M(b− a) + 2+ 2 logM . We see that
lim
M→∞
M2e2e−M(b−a) = 2
lim
M→∞
2(logM + 1)−M(b− a) = log 2
lim
M→∞
M(b− a)
2(logM + 1)− log 2 = 1 (B.13)
Recalling that M = N − 2 for N ≥ 3, we can say that
lim
N→∞
N(b− a)
2 logN
= 1 (B.14)
What is the meaning of this result? We have shown that MML will prefer
the gappy model if there is a gap, b − a, in the data of approximately
(2 logN)/N . This is commendable. For if the true distribution were non-
gappy, then the expected size of the largest gap would still be (logN)/N .
Therefore, to prefer the gappy model when the largest gap in the data
is (logN)/N would be to leap to unwar anted conclusions. In fact, as we
showed, this is just what AIC does. Waiting until the the size of the largest
gap in the data is (2 logN)/N before switching over to the gappy model is
therefore very sensible behaviour.
Notes
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1We assume here that no two points are vertically aligned. If the data contains
two points that are vertically aligned, then polynomials of degree N − 1 can
get arbitrarily close to the data.
2The case discussed in 6.1.4, the Neyman-Scott problem, shows the problems
for AIC in a particularly stark way. But even in friendlier cases, where the amount
of data per parameter is not strictly bounded above (for example, the cases of
univariate polynomial regression (section 6.2.1), or econometric time series regression
(section 6.2.2)), AIC is generally the worst or nearly the worst estimator of those
studied for predictive accuracy.
3Minimum Message Length has important similarities and differences to Rissanen’s
Minimum Description Length (MDL) (Rissanen [1978], [1989], [1999]). They are
similar in that they share the aim of making an inference about the source of
the data (and not just making predictions about future data); they also share
the insight that inference is fundamentally connected to achieving a brief encoding
of the data. However, they differ in two important respects: firstly, Rissanen’s
work is non-Bayesian, and MDL tries to avoid any use of priors. Secondly, MDL
(like AIC) typically aims to infer only the model class from which the true (fully
specified) model comes, while MML aims to infer a single, fully specified model.
For detailed discussions of the differences between MML and MDL, see (Wallace
and Dowe [1999a]) and the other articles in that special issue of The Computer
Journal, as well as (Wallace [2005], Ch. 10.2) and (Comley and Dowe [2005], sec.
11.4.3). It is also worth mentioning that the 1978 version of MDL, although not
the later versions, is equivalent to Schwartz’s Bayes Information Criterion (BIC)
(Schwartz [1978]).
4Forster and Sober ([1994]) also discuss the consequences of their arguments
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for Bayesianism. However, since their main question is whether Bayesianism can
somehow replicate Akaike’s work, the significance of their discussion is rather
diminished when the shortcomings of AIC, demonstrated below, are fully appreciated!
5Unlike Maximum A Posteriori (MAP), which maximises a posterior density
and is generally not statistically invariant. See footnote 14 for more details.
6The equality is approximate rather than strict because code lengths must
be integers, while probabilities need not be. But the difference is negligible; in
fact − log pi ≈ li < − log pi + 1. Shannon ([1948]) proved that it is always
possible to construct such a codebook, and demonstrated a method for doing
so. See (Wallace [2005], Ch. 2) for a clear exposition.
7Unless the parameter estimates render xi impossible, such as if xi were 50
Heads followed by 50 Tails but the group parameter estimate was tha the probability
of Heads was 1.
8This problem was originally treated in (Wallace and Boulton [1975]). A more
detailed exposition than we offer here can be found in (Wallace [2005], Ch. 3.2.3).
9Wallace ([2005], p.160) notes, ‘If the set of possible models were discrete...the
correspondence would be exact. [But see (Wallace [2005], Ch. 3.2.1) and (Comley
and Dowe [2005], sec. 11.3.1) for caveats.] However, when h is a continuum...q(h)
is not the prior probability that “h is true”: indeed no non-zero probability could
be attached to such a statement. Nonetheless, the difference can play the role
of a negative log posterior probability, and its expectation is a good measure of
the “believability” of the estimates.’ An example of the need for some caution
in the interpretation of Eqn. (2) can be seen in (Wallace and Boulton [1975], Table
3, p.29), where the ratio exceeds unity for some possible data, typically those
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having relatively high likelihood given their associated parameter estimate.
10In case this use of improper priors should alarm friends or critics of Bayesianism,
Wallace includes some mathematical techniques for renormalising improper priors.
For example, a uniform prior distribution for a location parameter is improper,
but we can renormalise this prior by observing that the prior belief that the uniform
distribution is meant to capture is that the location is equally likely to be anywhere
within a large but finite range. As long as there is only negligible probability that
the data will reflect a location from outside this range, we need not even specify
what the range is. He also observes that improper priors, when combined with
real data, usually lead to proper posterior densities.
11We say this because Akaike’s argument in support of penalising the number
of parameters applies to continuous-valued parameters rather than discrete-valued
parameters. An example of an inference problem with discrete-valued parameters
is the inference of decision trees. If AIC can be defined for decision trees, then
it can presumably only take the form of penalising the log-likelihood with twice
the number of nodes. In the case of binary decision trees, this is equivalent to
a penalty of the number of nodes, which is the penalty function adopted in the
binary tree study by Murphy and Pazzani ([1994]). Even if we are to permit this
interpretation of AIC, MML has empirically been shown to work decidedly better
on this problem in (Needham and Dowe [2001]).
12Wallace and Freeman ([1987], p.241) give a laconic hint to this effect, mentioning
the second result but leaving the reader to draw out for themselves the conclusions
which follow from it. A much more detailed argument can be found in (Wallace
[2005], ch.3.4.5, pp.190-91), and an independent derivation of an almost identical
result can be found in (Barron and Cover [1991]).
64
D
ra
ft
13Strictly speaking, as Wallace ([2005], p.191) notes, because optimal encoding
ideally requires a non-integral number of binary digits (as in fn. 6), the above
arguments imply only that the assertion chosen by the SMML estimator lacks
at most one binary digit of information and contains at most one binary digit
of noise.
14The estimator derived using these approximations is often referred to as MML87;
for continuous-valued attributes, it can be thought of as maximising the posterior
density divided by the square root of the the Fisher information, which shows
clearly its difference from MAP estimation. More detailed expositions can be found
in (Wallace and Freeman [1987], sec. 5), (Wallace and Dowe [2000], sec. 2), and
(Wallace [2005], Ch. 5). For non-quadratic approximations to SMML, based on
different ideas, see (Wallace [2005], Ch. 4).
15For the precise conditions under which the approximations of (Wallace and
Freeman [1987]) can be applied, see (Wallace [2005], Ch. 5.1.1).
16In addition to the inference of decision trees mentioned in fn. 11, other such
problems include the hierarchical mixture modelling of (Boulton and Wallace
[1973]), as well as the generalised Bayesian networks of (Comley and Dowe [2003])
and (Comley and Dowe [2005]), which treat model families with mixtures of continuous
and discrete variables. These are but a few of many inference problems well-studied
in the machine learning and artificial intelligence literature for which AIC appears
to be undefined.
17Despite the fact that the choice of prior is independently motivated, some
sceptics about Bayesianism might still be troubled that the MML estimator has
been ‘cooked up’ by careful choice of prior. So it is worth noting that in fact the
choice of prior on its own makes the situation worse, changing the divisor in the
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estimator from N to N+1. What saves MML, and brings the divisor back from
N+1 to N−1, is the use it makes of the Fisher information, the expectation
of the determinant of the matrix of second partial derivatives of the negative log-
likelihood, which can be thought of as relating to the uncertainty of our estimates.
See (Wallace and Dowe [2000], sec. 2.1) for more details.
18The other criteria considered were N. I. Fisher’s modification to Maximum
Likelihood (Fisher [1993]), and G. Schou’s marginalised maximum likelihood (Schou
[1978]).
19Indeed, a theorem of Dowe’s shows that for the von Mises circular distribution,
when N = 2, regardless of the true value of κ (even with κ = 0), the expected
value of the ML estimate of κ is infinity.
20See also (Wallace [2005], Ch. 4.5) for further discussion.
21In section 5 (“Control of Improper Solutions by a Bayesian Modeling”) of
his paper on AIC and factor analysis (Akaike [1987], p.325), the inconsistency
of AIC on this problem not only led Akaike to adopt a Bayesian prior, but moreover,
a “prior” whose logarithm is proportional to the sample size.
22See (Wallace and Dowe [1999a], sec. 8) for other examples and further discussion.
23To be more precise, a version of AIC called final prediction error (FPE) is
used (Akaike [1970]). FPE is derived from AIC by estimating the variance of the
noise in the data independently for each model family (see Cherkassky and Ma
[2003], p.1694). The other methods compared are Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension
(Vapnik [1995]), Schwartz’s Bayes Information Criterion (Schwartz [1978]), and
Craven and Wahba’s Generalised Cross-Validation technique (Craven and Wahba
[1979]).
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24The functions tested are a trigonometric function, a logarithmic function,
a function with a discontinuous derivative, and a discontinuous function. It is
important to note that none of the ‘true curves’ here are actually polynomial
functions. As Cherkassky and Ma ([2003]) point out, this violates an assumption
of AIC that the true model is among the possible models. However, we do not
therefore consider the comparison between MML and AIC to be unfair to AIC,
for three reasons: (1) the theory of minimum message length is in part motivated
by the same assumption, so violating it seems equally unfair to both methods;
(2) as Cherkassky and Ma ([2003]) also note, AIC is often used in contexts where
this assumption does not hold; and (3) the violation of the assumption is realistic,
in the sense that many real-world settings require us to pick the best polynomial
approximation to a function where we cannot be sure that the true model is a
polynomial function. The problem of predicting the intensity of tropical cyclones
by modelling them as second-order polynomials, tackled in (Rumantir and Wallace
[2003]) and discussed below in section 6.2.3, is an example.
25The results for the other model selection criteria mentioned in fn. 23 have
been removed from this table. AIC was clearly the worst of all the methods studied.
26This is why the maximum degree considered is only 8, rather than 20.
27The other criteria tested were Schwartz’s Bayesian Information Criterion
(Schwartz [1978]) and a criterion due to Hannan and Quinn (Hannan and Quinn
[1979]). MML also outperformed both these criteria in the test.
28Related, but more complex, illustrations of this point may be found in (Wallace
and Boulton [1975]) and (Wallace and Dowe [1999b]).
29Like AIC, Strict MML overshoots the simplest model family containing the
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true model in the sense that it typically selects a model from a more complex
family. (Although SMML doesn’t overshoot in the same way—for SMML, unlike
AIC, the terms in the higher co-efficients are insignificant.) Like AIC, Strict MML
converges on the true model as the number of data goes to infinity. And we agree
with Forster that the definition of the simplest model family containing the true
model is dependent on how the parameter space is defined, and so is not something
we should be interested in per se. Rather, we should be interested in inferring
the true model itself. However, as we show below in section 7.1, a simple modification
to Strict MML solves the problem of inferring the simplest model family containing
the true model if we are interested in solving it.
30The form of the estimator described here and that used in (Wallace [1997])
and reported on in section 6.2.1 are not exactly the same, but the differences
are inessential. The purpose of Wallace’s study was to compare different model
selection criteria. He therefore estimated the parameters of each model family
using the method of Maximum Likelihood. However, since univariate polynomial
regression is one of those problems in which the likelihood function is well-behaved,
using MML (rather than Maximum Likelihood) to estimate the parameters of
each model family would not have given significantly different answers.
31A nice example of this from a real world application of MML comes from
spam detection (Oliver [2005]). Spammers often use templates that can be filled
with random text to make each spam unique. Spam-detectors are therefore interested
in the problem of inferring the template from which a given spam was generated.
As Oliver explicitly notes, this is a problem where we are interested very much
in inference to the best fully specified model, and not at all in predicting the precise
form that future spam generated from that model will take.
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32Strictly speaking, while Forster’s claim is very nearly right, we don’t completely
agree with it. But there isn’t space here to explore the reasons for our slight dissent.
33Here’s his argument: consider an example in which there are two models A
and B, where A asserts that θ = 0 and B asserts that θ 6= 0. If what it means
to say that A is approximately true is that the true value of θ is infinitesimally
close to 0, then there is a member of B that is also approximately true in virtue
of being infinitesimally close to 0.
34Wallace and Boulton ([1975], sec. 3.3) give a justification of why we should
choose this particular discrete model of the problem, appealing to a frequentist
interpretation of probability. For problems whose context makes a frequentist
interpretation inappropriate, Wallace elsewhere (Wallace and Dowe [1999a]; Wallace
[2005], Ch. 6.7.2, p.275) appeals to an interpretation of probability in terms of
Turing machines and algorithmic complexity.
35Classical statisticians do not normally discuss the accuracy to which the data
is stated, despite the fact that all data must be recorded with some finite accuracy
in order that it be recorded at all. ε can, however, be arbitrarily small. This is
an important technical point: if ε were bounded below for all data points, AIC
could escape the charge that it always prefers the gappy model: for then at some
point, the uncertainty regions around the data points would overlap with each
other, leaving no room for any gaps. However, this escape route out of statistical
inconsistency for AIC only appears because of the introduction of an MML measurement
accuracy, and the inconsistency returns if we simply let the measurement accuracy
εi of data point xi (previously ε) depend upon i and tend to 0 sufficiently quickly.
36Since there are regularity conditions that must be satisfied in order to apply
AIC, it might be that one of the regularity conditions is not satisfied. But, in
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that case, AIC selects no model at all!
37In everything that follows all logarithms are natural logarithms (loge), and
hence all message lengths are in ‘natural bits’ or ‘nits’ (Boulton and Wallace [1970];
Comley and Dowe [2005], sec. 11.4.1). 1 nit = log2 e bits; 1 bit = loge 2 nits.
38Because it does not matter in what order we state the parameters of the model,
a and b, it possible to devise a code that saves loge 2 nits in the length of the
assertion of that part of the gappy model.
39There is a potential concern with the expression LG in the case that b−a <
δ, because in that case, the uncertainty regions around the gap-limits cross over
(see Figure 1). However, as we show below at expression B.14, we only use LG
(in preference to LNG) in the case that b− a >≈ (2 logN)/N , which for large
N is substantially greater than δ = 2[1− (b− a)]/(N − 2) ≈ 2
N
.
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Table 1
Groups, success count ranges and estimates of the Strict MML estimator for the
Binomial distribution, 100 trials, uniform prior.
j cj hj
1 0 0
2 1–6 0.035
3 7–17 0.012
4 18–32 0.25
5 33–49 0.41
6 50–66 0.58
7 67–81 0.74
8 82–93 0.875
9 94–99 0.965
10 100 1.0
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Table 2
Comparison of MML and AIC on the task of selecting a polynomial
approximation to a non-polynomial function. Adapted from (Wallace [1997]).
Target function: y = sin2(pi(x+ 1.0))
1000 Cases, N = 10, NoiseSD = 0.61
signal/noise = 10.0
KEY MML AIC
AV 0.1857 15.8055
SD 0.2633 63.8077
5pc 0.0078 0.0091
25pc 0.0385 0.0863
50pc 0.1236 0.7974
75pc 0.1880 5.4448
95pc 0.6075 60.7315
99pc 1.3700 306.5231
Max 3.0411 771.4965
DEG avERR CNT avERR CNT
0 0.141 222 0
1 0.281 33 0
2 0.406 27 7.587 2
3 0.698 23 13.099 17
4 0.303 177 39.709 78
5 0.421 30 18.996 214
6 0.106 426 10.882 340
7 0.112 52 18.547 195
8 0.095 10 7.068 154
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